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PROBLEMS WITH POPPER
by Alan B. Whiting
University of Birmingham
Professor Karl R. Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of
science in the twentieth century. He is most widely known for his doctrine that
scientific theories are not provable, but to be accepted as scientific they must be
falsifiable. The most-cited statement of this is from the Postscript to his Logic
of Scientific Discovery1:
. . . we adopt, as our criterion of demarcation, the criterion of falsifi-
ability, i. e. of an (at least) unilateral or asymmetrical or one-sided
decidability. According to this criterion, statements, or systems of
statements, convey information about the empirical world only if
they are capable of clashing with experience; or more precisely, only
if they can be systematically tested, that is to say, if they can be
subjected (in accordance with a ‘methodological decision’) to tests
which might result in their refutation. (pp. 313-4, §*i(2); his italics,
as they will be henceforth)
The book contains far more than this statement, however. I set out some
problems with it below.
1 Experimental uncertainty
After asserting that every physical measurement is equivalent to noting a pointer’s
position between two marks on a scale, which thus correspond to an interval
within which the measurement lies, Popper continues:
It is the custom of physicists to estimate the interval for every mea-
surement. (Thus following Millikan they give, for example, the el-
ementary charge of the electron, measured in electrostatic units, as
e = 4.774 . 10−10, adding that the range of imprecision is±0.005 . 10−10.)
But this raises a problem. What can be the purpose of replacing, as
it were, one mark on a scale by two—to wit, the two bounds of the
interval—when for each of these two bounds there must again arise
the same question: what are the limits of accuracy for the bounds
of the interval?
Giving the bounds of the interval is clearly useless unless these two
bounds in turn can be fixed with a degree of precision greatly ex-
ceeding what we can hope to attain for the original measurement;
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fixed, that is, within their own intervals of imprecision which should
thus be smaller, by several orders of magnitude, than the interval
they determine for the value of the original measurement. In other
words, the bounds of the interval are not sharp bounds but are really
very small intervals, the bounds of which are in their turn still much
smaller intervals, and so on. In this way we arrive at the idea of
what may be called the ‘unsharp bounds’ or ‘condensation bounds’
of the interval. (p. 125, §37)
There are two points I wish to make about this passage. First, while such
a naive misconception of experimental uncertainty might be understandable
in someone who had never had contact with science at all, it is bizarre in a
professor who is writing a book purporting to set out very basic aspects of
science. Second, this misunderstanding generates a whole conceptual structure
(of ‘condensation bounds’), not only taking up space in itself but developing
further ideas (notably §68).
A significant fraction of the book is given over to criticism of the quantum
theory, in particular attempts to design thought-experiments to disprove the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. I will not go into them in any detail here,
since it would require a great deal of time and attention; some criticism (too
lenient, in my view) of his later writings on the subject has been published2.
But a taste may be found on pp. 239-40, in which a monochromatic beam of
particles has been prepared (thus they are all of a single momentum); we are
then, by ‘focusing our attention’ on those within an arbitrarily small volume, to
deterine position and momentum to any desired accuracy. That Popper can set
this (explicitly ‘unphysical’) procedure as a serious possibility shows something
of his incomprehension of the basics of experimental physics.
2 Mathematics
Most of the book is taken up with an analysis of the mathematical theory of
probability, including criticism of others’ formulations and a detailed presenta-
tion of Popper’s own construction. Before treating probability as such, I want
to look at a couple of examples of Popper’s use of mathematics.
In the first, Popper is concerned with the definition of a probability appar-
ently given by von Mises. In a sequence of events, the fraction is formed of
‘successes’ in which a particular thing occurs divided by the total number of
events. If this fraction, called by Popper the ‘relative frequency,’ converges to a
definite number in the limit of an infinitely long sequence, that number is the
probability of success∗. The particular example used is the fraction of ones in a
sequence of ones and zeroes.
∗Popper does not quote von Mises explicity. From the description it appears that the latter
dealt with ‘convergence in probability,’ a phrase that Popper does not mention, but which he
would not have cared for.
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Popper wishes to do without the requirement of convergence. That means,
he argues, he needs a concept that can be used in place of a limiting frequency,
applicable to all infinite sequences.
One frequency concept fulfilling these conditions is the concept of
a point of accumulation of the sequence of relative frequencies. (A
value a is said to be a point of accumulation of a sequence if after
any given element there are elements deviating from a by less than
a given amount, however small.) That this concept is applicable
without restriction to all infinite reference sequences may be seen
from the fact that for every finite alternative at least one such point
of accumulation must exist for the sequence of relative frequencies
which corresponds to it. Since relative frequencies can never be
greater than 1 nor less than 0, a sequence of them must be bounded
by 1 and 0. And as an infinite bounded sequence, it must (according
to the famous theorem of Bolzano and Wierstrass) have at least one
point of accumulation. (p. 185, §64)
The definition of accumulation point in the references I have at hand3,4 is
not the same, nor equivalent. However, Popper’s definition is probably con-
tained within it, so we will pass over that point. His statement of the Bolzano-
Wierstrass theorem is accurate, except for the application to a ‘finite alterna-
tive.’
The theorem only holds for infinite squences; in fact, a finite sequence has no
accumulation points3. In the paragraph above, his mention of ‘finite sequences’
suggests (at least) that he has not grasped this requirement; this is proved on
the next page (p. 186n4), where he applies the concept of accumulation points
to finite and infinite sequences indiscriminantly. Let me be explicit: Popper is
using a theorem in an area where it just isn’t true.
The real problem with using accumulation points is that, while the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem assures us of at least one, there may be many. Popper
realizes this (p. 185n2), and spends some time on the rather trivial point that,
in this case, they are not useful in defining probability. He also recognises that
to require a unique accumulation point is equivalent to requiring convergence
(p. 186). Then he requires uniqueness anyway, asserting that it isn’t, and in
any case that he is free to choose such sections of any sequence as have the
behaviour he desires (p. 186n4).
I will pass over these last two problems with mathematical logic, because
in fact accumulation points are irrelevant to the task Popper attempts in this
section. The importance of this episode is not so much that Popper makes
mistakes in the handling of accumulation points, which could be considered a
rather esoteric bit of analysis; nor even in his failure to distinguish between
finite and infinite, though that is certainly a serious drawback for anyone trying
to do mathematics. It lies in the fact that he is not competent in this whole
area of analysis, deploying irrelevant machinery and doing that improperly.
Let us look at another section of mathematics, set theory. Popper refers to
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Kolmogorov’s development of a theory of probability that explicitly uses sets.
But he does not like it:
And yet, he [Kolmogorov] assumes that, in ‘p(a, b)’—I am using my
own symbols, not his [that is, the probability of a given b]—a and
b are sets; thereby excluding, among others, the logical interpreta-
tion according to which a and b are statements (or ‘propositions’, if
you like). He says, rightly, ‘what the members of this set represent
is of no importance’; but this remark is not sufficient to establish
the formal character of the theory at which he aims; for in some
interpretations, a and b have no members, nor anything that might
correspond to members. (p. 327, §*iv)
Nowadays set theory is taught in elementary school; I am not sure what
its status was when Popper wrote. But among the very first concepts one
comes across is ∅, the empty set, the set with no members. Also among the
first concepts is that a set may be made up of anything, including statements,
propositions, truth-values, complex numbers, apples, oranges—or all at once. I
cannot escape the conclusion that here Popper is criticising an approach knowing
nothing about it. Indeed, in a later section (pp. 344-5, §*iv) he demonstrates
the ‘superiority’ of his ‘Boolean’ approach over the ‘set-theoretic’ approach by
performing set operations.
In presenting these two examples I am not asserting that Popper’s mistakes
and misconceptions necessarily make all of his later work wrong. That would
take a rather tedious effort of working through hundreds of pages of sometimes
convoluted logic. I am asserting that he has attempted to produce results with
mathematics that he does not understand or, worse, understands wrongly.
3 The probability of a hypothesis
Popper takes issue with the idea that a theory, a hypothesis, may be rendered
more probable by a series of observations.
Let us now try to follow up the suggestion that the hypotheses them-
selves are sequences of statements. One way of interpreting it would
be to take, as elements of the sequence, the various singular state-
ments which can contradict, or agree with, the hypothesis. The
probability of the hypothesis would then be determined by the truth-
frequency of those among the statements which agree with it. But
this would give the hypothesis a probability of 1/2 if, on the average,
it is refuted by every second singular statment of the sequence! (p.
257, §80)
After considering a few modifications of this idea, he concludes,
This seems to me to exhaust the possibilities of basing the concept of
the probability of a hypothesis on that of the frequency of true state-
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ments (or the frequency of false ones), and thereby on the frequency
theory of the probability of events. (p. 260, §80)
There are two points to make about these statements immediately. One
is that Popper has set up an algorithm for the testing of a hypothesis that is
crude by any standard, and would not for a moment be entertained by anyone
actually attempting to test a hypothesis. The second is that, in presenting this
algorithm, he has set up a ‘strawman,’ any by refuting it has pretended to refute
all methods of testing a hypothesis (and giving it a greater or lesser probability)
by examining events†.
Before returning to the question of the probability of a hypothesis I want to
bring out two other examples presented by Popper concerning basic calculations
in probability. First, he wants to disprove the ‘subjectivist theory of evidence,’
what we would now call the Bayesian approach (pp. 407-8, §*ix). Given a coin,
what is the probability of heads? Well, one-half. Now given that the same
coin gave 500,000 heads (±1350) in one million trials, what is the probability?
One-half again. Hence, under the subjectivist theory, after a million coin flips
we have learned nothing.
Popper believes this exercise disproves the idea of associating a probability
with a subjective belief in an outcome (the initial guess of one-half), what we
would now call a Bayesian prior. What he has actually done, by setting up the
problem in a way that no one with a background in even classical probability
would do, is prove that if an initial guess proves correct, we do not change our
minds‡.
Before we go on to the question of the absolute probability of a theory, there
is one section that I think illuminates Popper’s preconceptions in an interesting
way. On p. 390, §*ix, he deals with the throw of a die. We take p(x) as the
probability of throwing a six, p(x¯) that of the negation (throwing anything else).
Initially, with no information, we set the probabilities as 1/6 and 5/6. Then, we
are given the information that that throw is an even number. The probabilities
are now 1/3 and 2/3. The information has supported the hypothesis x and
weakened its negation x¯; but the fact that the probability of x is still smaller
than x¯ is considered by Popper ‘clearly self-contradictory,’ and thus proof that
any calculation of the support or refutation of a hypothesis (a theory) cannot
be done within any conventional probability theory. Well, self-contradictory it
is not. He appears to require that any support of a theory (a hypothesis) make
it more probable than its negation, a rather absolute position. He neither states
this explicity nor attempts to defend it (and defense it certainly requires), but
it underlies his work in this section.
We now come to Popper’s calculation of the probability of a theory, any
theory, in the universe. It is probably set out most clearly on pp. 363-8, §*vii.
†He may have derived this formulation from an equation he attributes to Jeffries, p. 370,
§*vii, which he does not appear to understand.
‡The more useful question is, before the coin gets flipped, how sure are we of the initial guess
of probability one-half? But there are many introductory texts that consider the problem of
the possibly biased coin, so I will not go into more detail here.
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The probability of a theory is set equal to the product of the probabilities of all
events predicted by the theory, p(a) =
∏
p(an). Since each component p(an)
can never be greater than unity, may in fact be less, and they will be infinite in
number, the product will always go to zero. Hence the probability of any theory
is exactly zero.
I have already noted that this is not the way to work out the probability
of a hypothesis, given data. It also assumes that all events in the universe
are independent. Popper formally recognises this, but asserts they must be,
otherwise we could never learn anything new (p. 368)§. What it actually implies
is total chaos—no event would have any relation to any other, and from one
moment to another, from one point to another, anything could happen.
Popper concludes something almost as depressing. If a is any theory and b
is any information, always
p(a) = 0
p(a|b) = 0
The consequences of this result will be traced in the next section. For the
moment, let me emphasize that Popper’s understanding of elementary proba-
bility was inadequate and flawed, not attaining the point of being able to test
a possibly biased coin.
4 Consequences
Popper’s conclusions to this point led him to construct a ‘calculus of relative
probability’ in which all of the following formulae may be valid (p. 331, §*iv):
p(a, bb¯) = 1
If p(b¯, b) 6= 0 then p(a, b) = 1
If p(a, a¯b) 6= 0 then p(a, b) = 1
These allow some very strange things to happen. In the first, some situation a
is certain to happen, given both b and its negation. That is, the given situation
requires a single flip of a coin to be both heads and tails. The second or third
again allow a nonzero probability to a situation and its negation: given that a
die has rolled a six, it is possible it rolled one through five.
In addition, one could also have simultaneously (for theories a1 and a2),
p(a1, a2) = 0
p(a2, a1) = 1
§In passing, I note this logical fallacy: Popper is asserting that if we do not know everything,
we are required to know nothing.
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while at the same time p(a1) = p(a2) = 0 (p. 375, §*vii). Eventually he intro-
duces a notion to express the fact that, while the probability of every theory is
zero, some zeroes are bigger than others (pp. 375-6, §*vii).
The kindest thing to say about a system that purports to do anything with
these statements is that it assigns meaning to something essentially meaningless.
In fact one could say Popper has succeeded in his goal of creating something
that is not as ‘weak’ as conventional probability (p. 330, §*iv). By assigning
a non-zero probability to a situation in which a statement and its negation are
both true, his system can generate nonsense. He does not appear to notice the
inconsistency of this with his claim to be implementing Boolean logic (p. 328,
§*iv). In any case, it is not something to be proud of.
5 Summary
In his most famous work, Karl Popper demonstrated an inadequate and occa-
sionally incorrect understanding of science, mathematics and especially proba-
bility at an elementary level. I have not here looked at his philosophical ideas,
but it would be surprising if anything of much use could be built on such a base.
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